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Discussions of Egypt’s political place in the world tend to come attached to 
fairly standard narratives. For example, scholars working in the field of international 
relations have often described the period connected to Egyptian decolonization in 
terms of a particular chain of events. The story goes that, in the years following the 
Free Officers’ coup of July 1952, the British occupation of Egypt finally ended, and 
the United States jostled for influence in the country at the same time as the Cold War 
grew in resonance. Meanwhile, after Gamal Abdel Nasser had usurped Muhammad 
Nagib as the Free Officers’ leader in 1954, the coup started to become constructed as 
a revolution. Eventually—and particularly after the Bandung conference in 1955, the 
cataclysm of Suez in 1956 and the creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958—
Soviet planners moved in, the Egyptian state became massively centralized and Third 
World and Pan-Arab identities increased in importance. Simultaneously, in addition 
to histories of his eventual undoing after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, studies of the 
increasing consolidation of Nasser’s political power abound.1  
However, as Laura Bier has noted, there are alternatives to this (fairly linear) 
decolonization narrative. Discussing the set of practices that she terms Egyptian state 
feminism, Bier asserts that ‘what such studies leave out are the countless struggles to 
define the content and meaning of the [Nasserist] project that occurred in other 
arenas.’2 This chapter deals with one such arena. Archaeological practice—and the 
representation of archaeological remains more generally—helped to define Egyptian 
state projects during the post-1952 period and also forged connections between Egypt 
and wider political processes: the spread of the Cold War, for example. In this 
manner, archaeological work comprised one of ‘the countless struggles’ to constitute 
the meaning of Egyptian decolonization, and unlike certain political narratives, the 
history of archaeology in Egypt makes clear that the process of defining and 
dispersing decolonized political power in the country not only occurred from the top 
down. This process also occurred, perhaps literally, from the ground up as 
archaeological field work took place. After briefly discussing archaeological 
representations from Egypt’s decolonizing era and discussing the historical 
background to the practice of archaeology in Egypt, this chapter illustrates this thesis 
by concentrating on an excavation carried out just south of Cairo in the mid-1950s at 
the site of Mit Rahina (ancient Memphis). This case study emphasizes the necessity of 
bringing the role of archaeological work, hitherto barely discussed, into wider 




[B] Archaeological Representations in the Egyptian Media 
 
A vastly contradictory set of political spheres engulfed Egypt and its archaeological 
remains, and representations of archaeological tourism during the period of Egyptian 
decolonization provide a convenient introduction to them. The drive to attract foreign 
visitors to Egypt’s archaeological sites had long played a role in defining the 
country’s place vis-à-vis the rest of the world.4 After 1952, this drive would also 
become a potent indicator of the complexity of Egypt’s decolonization narrative, at 
least in terms of the touristic representations that circulated around Egypt’s 
archaeological spaces and the heterogeneous political narratives to which these 
representations could be connected. These representations attest to a country with a 
constantly—and perhaps purposefully—fluid relationship with various political 
contexts. This complex situation belies the meta-narratives imposed upon Egypt in 
histories of international relations, and starts to suggest how people actually mediated 
those meta-narratives, at least in the press. 
 For instance, the Egypt Travel Magazine attempted to attract an English-
speaking audience to the country.
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 However, the representations contained within the 
publication also indicate the heterogeneous discourses being mobilized around 
Egyptian archaeological sites. Take issue number 75 of November 1960: the 
publication carried the name of the Egypt Travel Magazine, but the front cover of this 
issue also carried the discreet reminder—as a subtitle in a much smaller font—that 
Egypt officially constituted the southern region of the United Arab Republic (a 
political union with Syria that had begun in 1958). Egypt, as the cover made clear, 
possessed multiple identities, and inside this issue, stories relating to archaeology 
further attested to this situation. At a time (just two years after the Suez Crisis) when 
British relations with Egypt had apparently suffered, an article entitled ‘First British 
cruise arrives’ had a remarkably upbeat tone. The article noted that ‘this is the first 
time that a cruise composed entirely of British tourists and organized by the Royal 
Mail Lines has touched port at Alexandria since the Iberia in 1955.’ The article also 
discussed how ‘all [the passengers] were able to visit the Pyramids and Sphinx.’6  
While clearly a promotional ruse, this transparent attempt to woo further 
British visitors demonstrates how the lure of Egypt’s archaeology placed the country 
within multiple conflicting international sphere: whether the pan-Arab United Arab 
Republic or a Britain attracted by the romantic lure of Egyptian antiquities. Other 
articles also melded discussions of archaeology and the attraction of other 
international constituencies to Egypt. For instance, one piece discussed the visit of 
Hamengkubuwono IX, the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the Minister and Chair of the 
Superior Council of Tourism in Sukarno’s Indonesia. The article noted that the Sultan 
had come to Egypt to inspect the country’s tourist facilities, and he had also visited 
archaeological sites in Luxor.
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 Meanwhile, another article reported the visit of the 
(American) Chairman of Rotary International and his wife, who visited the pyramids, 
located in ‘Egypt, the crossroads of a new world’.8 They also attended a dinner in 
Cairo’s Nile Hilton, which, after its construction during the second half of the 1950s, 
was the preeminent establishment for visitors to the country’s archaeological sites. 
The Nile Hilton potently signified Egypt’s contradictory relationship with the 
American power structures that the country’s revolutionary leadership had apparently 
rejected: as Annabel Wharton has noted, Conrad Hilton tied his growing hotel 
network to ‘Free World’ ideals circulating within the US.9 Thus, from the front cover 
of the Egypt Travel Magazine onwards, there is a political ambiguity in the articles 
that the publication contains that is hard to reconcile with any straightforward 
narrative of Egypt’s nonaligned place in the world. 
The Arabic language press also indicated the complex political spheres 
enveloping Egypt’s archaeological sites. Every time celebrities or international dance 
and theatre troupes visited Egypt, it seemed that the press corps—presumably in 
collusion with state tourism representatives—would make the visitors undergo a 
photo opportunity at the pyramids and ask them for some positive words about the 
country. Yet these opportunities also revealed the deep ambiguities of Egypt’s place 
in the world. In January 1958, for instance, Akhir Saʿa, a weekly illustrated magazine, 
pictured the Hollywood star Linda Christian in front of the pyramids. The 
accompanying report emphasized Christian’s more local background (‘the woman 
born in Palestine and who lived in the East’).10 However, the accompanying pictures 
also made clear the apparent allure of Hollywood glamour to readers in Egypt, 
illustrating the star beaming in the spotlight atop a camel. Even at a time when the 
Soviet Union had taken an apparently increased role in Egyptian life, then, America’s 
influence over Egypt never entirely faded. Press representations provide a convenient, 
if not necessarily very deep, introduction to such a contradictory political whirl as it 
manifested itself around archaeological sites. However, events at the sites themselves 
were significantly more meaningful. 
 
[B] Practising the Modern in Archaeology 
 
Archaeological practices on the ground echoed, and perhaps helped to constitute, this 
political ambiguity. One excavation, a collaborative exercise between the University 
of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology (University Museum) 
and the Egyptian Department of Antiquities, provides a particularly helpful example. 
Beginning in 1953 and ending in 1957, these two institutions negotiated, carried out 
and closed down their work at the site of Mit Rahina.
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 This process, including the act 
of excavation itself, attempted to come to terms with and also influence the political 
direction a decolonized Egypt would take—from both the American and the Egyptian 
side. On one level, as the excavation’s quick termination suggests, this attempt failed. 
However, on another level, archaeological practices indeed aided the constitution of 
Egypt’s now-revolutionary future. Away from meta-narratives of international 
relations, the definition of Egypt’s future place in the world thus took place on, and 
also in, the (archaeological) ground. 
 Some historical context makes clear why this political act of archaeological 
definition occurred. Both after, but also prior to, the Free Officers’ coup of July 1952, 
archaeological work in Egypt existed within a state of more general political flux. The 
coup was one event in a much longer anti-colonial struggle, and among the matters 
comprising that struggle, antiquities had proven a longstanding source of contention. 
After 1922, when the discovery of Tutankhamun’s tomb had coincided with Britain’s 
unilateral granting of nominal (if not actual) independence to Egypt, Egyptian claims 
to ownership and control of antiquities found in the country became increasingly 
vocal. More importantly, they also became increasingly successful.
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 Egyptian 
government officials now placed the representatives of the largely Western 
infrastructure of institutions dedicated to excavating in, and removing artefacts from, 
Egypt on the defensive by threatening their ability to carry out these acts.
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 Among 
other institutions related to the Egyptian past, officials worked hard to make sure that 
the Department of Egyptian Antiquities (or Maslihat al-Athar al-Misriyya), the 
government body in charge of administering ancient archaeological sites and the 
Museum of Egyptian Antiquities in Cairo, became comprised of an increasingly 
Egyptian staff. Since its foundation in the nineteenth century, members of the 
Department, many of whom were foreign, had worked under a French director. That 
director would remain French until after the Free Officers’ coup of 1952. However, 
the institution’s (often British) mid-level employees were increasingly embattled, as 
more Egyptians laid claim to their jobs in the period from 1922 onward.
14
  
Debates about Egyptian modernity, as well as its gradual construction, helped 
to constitute this process. Indeed, the establishment of a thoroughly Egyptian 
Department of Egyptian Antiquities occurred at the same time as the modern 
Egyptian nation-state became an increasingly manifest entity.
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 Thus, the enactment 
of this process made the country’s past a central part of its move toward 
decolonization. From 1925, the newly founded (and explicitly modern and secular) 
Egyptian University in Cairo started to train the state’s citizens in various facets of 
Egyptian archaeology, institutionalizing the past as a phenomenon that an 
appropriately educated group of Egyptian citizens could tackle. Meanwhile, the 
Ministry of Education took charge of the Department of Egyptian Antiquities, 
alongside various other institutions that dealt with Coptic and Arab antiquities. Placed 
under the appropriate Ministry, antiquities administration became a field within which 
Egyptian citizens could not only claim appropriate, trained understanding: now, they 
could assert the ability to work in this field, too, by citing the authority of rational, 
even technocratic, expertise in administering archaeological work in their country.
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In turn, this action helped to realize the possibilities of decolonized Egypt by pointing 
to the inevitability of a wholly Egyptian-run country.   
The events of July 1952 confirmed the potency of this specifically Egyptian 
body of modernist technocrats. For the first time, an Egyptian, Mustafa Amer, 
previously Rector of Faruq University in Alexandria, became Director of the 
Department of Egyptian Antiquities. Subsequently, in 1953, a change in the law 
centralized all government departments related to Egypt’s ancient past into one new 
Department of Antiquities, also under Amer’s control.17 In this context of national 
modernization, the cooperative work at Mit Rahina took place, representing one, but 
certainly not the only, attempt by archaeological practitioners from elsewhere to stake 
their claim to continued relevance within this modernizing (and soon to be 
revolutionary) Egyptian world. Significantly, then, this attempt also illustrates how 
archaeological work that took place in this decolonizing context could become 
entwined with much wider political ideals, helping define what decolonization in 
Egypt actually meant.               
 
[B] Developing Egypt from the Ground Up 
 
The University Museum’s representatives purposefully tied the excavation at Mit 
Rahina to discourses of development and modernization. At least in the US context, 
these discourses had become increasingly incorporated into Cold War policies.
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 At 
this stage, tying archaeological work to such modernizing practices also provided the 
perfect point for American entry into Egypt, particularly as many of the technocrats 
now employed by the Egyptian Department of Antiquities had themselves 
appropriated discourses of modernization over the previous few decades. Thus, the 
practice of archaeology in Egypt led to the potential materialization of conflicting 
political ideals in the country as Egyptian and American experts met.  
Egyptians such as Mustafa Amer had gained their positions of leadership by 
mobilizing the rationalizing discourses from which contemporary theories of 
development and modernization had gained prominence. Originally trained in Egypt, 
but also possessing a Master’s degree in geography from the University of Liverpool, 
Amer emphasized the need for Egyptians to produce modern scientific knowledge: he 
believed that such knowledge constituted ‘a prerequisite for Egypt’s entry into the 
modern world’.19 Embodying the increasing prominence of discourses of expertise 
(khibra) and scientific and technical development in Egypt, technocrats like Amer 
were deeply amenable to furthering this work on the ground as a national, and now 
revolutionary, project directed toward constituting Egypt’s future modernity.     
 Meanwhile, the University Museum’s representatives had other reasons to 
take serious heed of development and modernization discourses beyond their obvious 
applicability to the Egyptian context. These reasons, inherently tied to American 
conceptions of the early Cold War, varied from institutional self-interest to the 
apparently altruistic. They also indicated how, even when not set forward by official 
US government programmes, such Cold War discourses still made their way into the 
decolonizing world.
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 In the US, government policy linked development and 
modernization practices, which had historically coalesced in the Tennessee Valley 
Authority of the interwar New Deal, to the promotion of the national (and thus also 
‘Free World’) interest. Point Four, the US technical assistance programme announced 
by President Truman in his January 1949 inaugural address (and renamed and 
reconstituted several times, eventually becoming USAID), aimed to show the 
‘underdeveloped’ world the worth of American values of democracy and political 
community. Government officials viewed this work as a means of building the right 
sort of decolonized nation: one that subscribed to liberal democracy and capitalism, 
which would welcome the arrival of those values through the transfer of scientific and 
technological expertise offered by Point Four representatives.
21
  
 Such values possessed obvious appeal for the employees of the University 
Museum most closely involved with the Mit Rahina work. For instance, Rudolf 
Anthes, Curator of the University Museum’s Egyptian Section and in charge of the 
work at Mit Rahina on behalf of the institution, believed in the cultivation of a certain 
type of modernist liberty. A German émigré, Anthes was a trained Egyptologist who 
had worked in Berlin’s collection of Egyptian antiquities, held at the city’s Neues 
Museum. During the Second World War, the Nazi regime persecuted him due to his 
opposition to their ideologies; however, at the end of the conflict, he had ended up as 
Director of the Berlin collection. But due to the division of the city, Anthes then had 
to work in East Berlin while living in its West. He eventually seized the opportunity 
to move to Philadelphia and work for the University Museum, and also became a 
quiet proponent of certain, although certainly not all, Free World ideology.
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 A 
supporter of liberal ideals of citizenship, US development work clearly appealed to 
him. 
 The University Museum’s Director, the archaeologist Froelich Rainey, also 
had great interest in American development policy. Rainey had worked for the State 
Department during the Second World War and had links to the fledgling CIA and 
broader US foreign policy circles. Now, as Rainey planned a massively increased 
programme of international research work for his Museum’s employees, his 
movement within these official and quasi-official foreign policy networks clearly 
aided the formulation of his agenda. At one point, Rainey even placed CIA operatives 
among his excavation staff.
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 More potently, however, Rainey formulated the 
University Museum’s potential Mit Rahina work extensively in the style of US 
development policy. Rainey clearly saw—and believed in—the potential benefits of 
this policy for the promotion of his institution and his country. At the time of the 
initial Mit Rahina suggestion, he had apparently proposed similar work in Iraq, 
Turkey and Afghanistan.
24
   
Indeed, a consideration of the initial proposals for the excavation put together 
by Rainey and Anthes during 1953 and 1954 reflects how efficacious the two men 
found constructing an archaeological project that could make use of development and 
modernization policy. At the same time as US development experts worked with 
Egyptians on a land reclamation programme known as the Egyptian American Rural 
Improvement Service, so the University Museum proposal suggested naming the 
forthcoming excavation work the ‘Egyptian-American archaeological research 
programme’.25 This new programme echoed the cooperative nature of US 
development initiatives, a collaboration initially proposed by Rainey in a letter to the 
Egyptian historian Shafiq Ghurbal, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Education.
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The project called  
for work under the direction of Egyptians and Americans, [the] 
publication of results in both English and Egyptian [sic] if technically 
possible, agreement of the cooperating institutions on the site or sites 
to be excavated, and a division of [excavated] objects within the terms 
of the current Egyptian Antiquities Law.
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After a visit to Egypt in the first half of 1954, during which he discussed 
these proposals with government representatives including Amer, Anthes further 
refined these goals. The two organizations would still work together; additionally, 
the expert practitioners that the Museum promised to provide would also train 
Egyptians in the field, aiding the development of the Department of Antiquities’ 
workforce (if also in a way that suited the University Museum). Finally, the Museum 
agreed to bear much of the financial burden of the work, including publication, 
though the refined proposal did not make clear whether any excavated artefacts 
would ever return to America, leaving the possibility temptingly open.
28
  
The proposed Egyptian-American archaeological research programme 
represented a compromise solution buried in the contradictions of contemporary 
politics. On one level, through its adoption of development discourse, the 
programme opened archaeological work in Egypt to non-governmental cooperation 
with American institutions and practices at the same time as American political 
leaders worked to assert their, and their country’s, influence in the Middle East more 
generally. However, on another level, the proposed work allowed Egyptians to assert 
their own national development prerogatives, in particular by making use of the 
resources offered by the University Museum, at a time when decolonization 
proceeded swiftly. In practice, the two sides never completely resolved this issue, 
reflecting the problems encountered as US diplomats and technical assistance 
representatives sought to bring decolonizing states on side during the early stages of 
the Cold War. As much as the official levels of the political world, archaeological 
practice was an arena in which the wider meanings of Egyptian decolonization 
became real.        
 
[B} Shaping Land, Shaping People at Mit Rahina 
   
As work at Mit Rahina took shape on the ground, problems related to the work 
became increasingly clear. In particular, when translated onto the ground the work 
highlighted the practical limitations of US-style development aims. Indeed, the 
ground on which the project took shape played a central role in this situation. Land 
occupied a major place in development and modernization projects: as earlier 
examples like the Tennessee Valley Authority had shown, the use and shaping of land 
could potentially mould the actions of the people who lived and worked on it.
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Similar, then, to other US development projects such as the land reclamation scheme 
carried out by the Egyptian American Rural Improvement Service, the programme at 
Mit Rahina transparently attempted to mould people through controlling the ways 
they lived and worked on the archaeological site. Rudolf Anthes himself noted in 
April 1954 that ‘the Egyptians[,] if they are going to be efficient [archaeologists] in 
the future ... can’t do that without adapting themselves to the methods of European 
researchers.’30  
The work at Mit Rahina attempted to achieve this aim by shaping the practices 
and views of its Egyptian trainees as they carried out their work in the field along 
these ‘European’ (or, more broadly, Western) lines. This regulation, as became clear 
throughout the excavations, was to take place through the University Museum field 
team’s guidance of their trainees’ excavation, recording and timekeeping practices, in 
addition to some of their domestic habits.
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 Archaeologists working in Egypt long had 
understood the possibilities their field practice possessed for forming such disciplined 
subjects: the British archaeologist William Matthew Flinders Petrie, for instance, had 
connected such regulated work to his early twentieth-century eugenicist ideals.
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Now, the linking of the Mit Rahina work to Cold War ideals of modernization 
provided a new, up-to-date justification for this practice. Furthermore, the University 
Museum, which was also offered other potential sites, had excavated at Mit Rahina 
both during and for a few years after the First World War.
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 Beyond regulatory 
practices, then, returning to the site provided another chance to demonstrate what the 
University Museum could do in Egypt.   
However, making the work collaborative made implementing Western ideals 
at the site significantly harder. Chronologically parallel to the Egyptian American 
Rural Improvement Service and the Mit Rahina excavations, the Egyptian 
government had set up its own land reclamation programme, which it named Tahrir 
(or ‘Liberation’) Province. The programme attempted to demonstrate that Egypt could 
undertake modernization projects without foreign aid, and also undertake them on a 
large, even totalizing, scale by not only reclaiming land, but also using that process to 
construct an idealized Egyptian community. As Egypt’s new leaders began to reshape 
the country as a revolutionary nation-state, so the shaping of the land through its 
reclamation played a vital part in this process, much as it did at Mit Rahina.
34
  
Thus, beyond the other reasons that played a role in the choice of Mit Rahina, 
after meeting with Amer, Anthes noted that the ‘site anyhow must be done since the 
area is claimed by the peasants’.35 The work at Mit Rahina closely fit evolving 
modernization plans in Egypt. Indeed, Anthes’ use of the word ‘peasants’ aligned 
closely with this policy, which characterized the peasantry and the land they worked 
as an object of reform. As in Tahrir Province, that land could now be reclaimed and 
redistributed for the peasantry’s agricultural use.36 Choosing to work with this 
Egyptian modernization process was not necessarily problematic per se. However, the 
diplomatic choice of Mit Rahina as an excavation site caused significant problems, 
since the land there presented considerable difficulties in terms of its archaeological 
excavation. 
Indeed, the problems that the University Museum team encountered at the site 
made the demonstration of their expertise there almost impossible, rendering their 
proposed application of American development objectives increasingly difficult. Mit 
Rahina was located in the waterlogged earth of the Nile Valley’s floodplain, unlike 
many other archaeological sites in Egypt, which were more normally located on the 
country’s desert fringes. Anything extracted from the site was therefore found in 
something of a congealed mess, and during the excavations, diary entry upon diary 
entry illustrates how these circumstances, in addition to the way in which they created 
odd patterns of archaeological remains, made it difficult for the University Museum 
team to understand the material that they excavated. Indeed, in one particularly 
memorable instance in 1955, Anthes bemoaned: 
But why, for God’s sake, did they use these brick built squares as a deposit of 
broken (and fragmentary) pots? It may have some meaning that so many 




 Anthes’ exclamation verges on the meaningless, which in itself is telling: none 
of the University Museum team could understand the site where they had volunteered 
to work. For most of their time there, they simply could not give the site meaning. 
Ironically, the work at the site coincided with an increasing awareness among 
archaeologists elsewhere of the importance of understanding the earth itself, whether 
waterlogged or otherwise, for constructing interpretations of the past. In particular, 
the stratigraphic relationships of archaeological remains visible in the vertical 
‘sections’ at the side of excavation trenches had started to take on new meaning at this 
point in time as a means of understanding the relative chronologies of past human 
action that those sections embodied. In the post-World War II era of decolonization 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, archaeologists outside of Egypt 
claimed that their work could be applied around the world to an extent never before 
possible, helping them to understand the entirety of the human past in all of its 
variation. One archaeologist in particular, Mortimer Wheeler of the University of 
London’s Institute of Archaeology, even went so far as to claim that ‘there is no 
method proper to the excavation of a British site which is not applicable — nay, must 
be applied — to a site in Africa or Asia.’38 Wheeler subtly suggested that his own 
stratigraphic technique could be applied exactly where many of the world’s 
decolonizing nations were located, and it thus seems unsurprising that Anthes would 
later, in 1965, note in relation to Mit Rahina that:  
we learned by our own experience the fact which is elementary 
outside of Egypt, that only a coordinated system of horizontal and 
vertical cuts [in the ground] is adequate for the understanding of a site 
which has accumulated under changing living conditions ...
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Unfortunately, Anthes and his co-workers only realized the applicability of 
new forms of archaeological stratigraphy at Mit Rahina at the very end of the second 
excavation season, when the method’s inadvertent application in one particular trench 
allowed them finally to understand the relative chronology of the remains they had 
uncovered at the site.
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 After two seasons of scrabbling around Mit Rahina, and 
particularly after a second season during which the team took time to read material 
that highlighted the importance of stratigraphic sections in understanding complex 
archaeological remains, a section was eventually applied to the site that helped to 
make sense of what the team found within their excavation trenches. However, even 
then the team only applied this section accidentally: one excavation trench at Mit 
Rahina was so large that in order to undertake work there it became necessary to leave 
a central baulk, a ‘relief wall’, standing inside it until the very last minute.41 This 
baulk, when finally prepared for clearance so that the entire trench could be 
understood as a whole, revealed how the complex assortment of remains in the site 
had become formed and connected over time. Thus, only after staring at this section 
did Anthes realize, ‘our site now stands in a more significant position with regard to 
the whole Memphis area than could be realised before.’42 Only at the end of the 
second season of work could this claim to authority be made, and only then could the 
team’s expertise be justified.   
Indeed, notes made by Anthes make clear that despite efforts to assert the 
University Museum’s control, in addition to Western ideals, at Mit Rahina, local 
cultural forms seem to have consistently made themselves felt during the excavation. 
On-site practices reinforced Egyptian working hierarchies that had developed over the 
previous few decades. The group of skilled archaeological workers known as Quftis, 
who hailed from the town of Quft in Upper Egypt and who had formed a powerful 
comprador body since the time of Petrie’s excavations in Egypt in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, seem (from the available evidence) to have taken charge 
of much of the excavation work and also of the local villagers who laboured for the 
project.
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 Excavation practices thus mobilized field-based social practices that had 
developed throughout the decades prior to 1952, lending a significantly more ‘local’ 
flavour to the proceedings than had perhaps initially been imagined.   
Meanwhile, Egyptian insubordination also became an issue. Possessing little 
authority on the site, the University Museum team had little control over those 
individuals who the Department of Antiquities presented for training. In 1956, for 
example, the Department offered up Ibrahim ʿAbd el-Aziz, one of its employees, yet 
ʿAbd el-Aziz did not adapt well to discipline. On 17 March, Anthes complained that 
ʿAbd el-Aziz ‘does not appear before breakfast’.44 By 19 March, he pointedly noted 
that ‘Abd el Aziz [sic] has not shown up.’45 By 5 April, Anthes commented that ‘he is 
clever enough, but you can’t rely on him.’46 Later in the month, ʿAbd el-Aziz had not 
arrived again, and Anthes phoned Amer to tell him that ‘I should like to have him 
[ʿAbd el-Aziz] removed because we do not need him and do not want him any 
longer.’47 At Mit Rahina, the American development work that the excavation so 
obviously reflected received short shrift. In the archaeological sphere, attempts to 
influence the course of Egyptian decolonization from the Western side therefore 
appeared inconclusive.    
   
[B] Cancellation and Continuation 
 
After two seasons at Mit Rahina, both partners in the excavation wanted to cancel 
their involvement. Indeed, the University Museum’s management had consistently 
expressed doubt about the efficacy of sponsoring the dig. Certain individuals who sat 
on the institution’s Board of Managers suggested that the excavations had not 
produced the artefacts that the Museum had so desired in its initial proposal. 
Therefore, the Board, together with Rainey, whose motivation for supporting the 
work also seemed to dwindle as Mit Rahina failed to produce what he perceived as 
any useful results, used the 1956 Suez crisis and its aftermath as a pretext not to 
continue with the renewed excavations that Anthes had planned, much as on certain 
levels, US involvement with Egypt itself slightly declined at this point in time. 
Indeed, Anthes’ inadvertent success at the site at the end of the second season, and 
also his connected hope for improved work there, won him little institutional favour 
under these circumstances.
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 The work at Mit Rahina seemed not to have produced 
anything of much value, whether in terms of artefacts or in terms of appropriately 
trained Egyptians.   
 The attitude behind this cancellation also demonstrated a striking disconnect 
from changing Egyptian discussions about antiquities, which emphasized that 
Egyptian relations with the wider world were as influenced by fields like archaeology 
as political practice more generally. In particular, these discussions, reflecting the 
manner in which US-style practices at Mit Rahina had failed to counter various 
Egyptian assertions of power, started to mirror the Egyptian state’s own increasing 
assertiveness. Despite the presence of international excavation teams in the country, 
discussions increasingly attempted to make certain that Egyptian hands would take 
total control of Egypt’s material past, whether in the field or elsewhere, at the same 
time as Egyptian officials took increasing control of the country’s future, particularly 
after Suez. Such control did not merely extend to the Egyptianization of the 
Department of Antiquities. Debates also took place in the Egyptian press, influenced 
by policy rumblings emanating from the state’s structures of governance, as to 
whether the government should further regulate the country’s antiquities trade.49  
Meanwhile, under the terms of a cultural exchange agreement with Egypt, 
Polish archaeologists had also recently started excavation in Egypt.
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 Members of 
Western institutions perceived this move as a rejoinder to their own work. Indeed, 
Anthes and certain members of his excavation staff expressed concern that Western 
influence in Egypt would dwindle and Soviet influence increase if Western 
archaeological work did not continue uninterrupted.
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 The excavations at Mit Rahina 
may not have formed an explicit part of US policy in Egypt. They may not even have 
been that successful by 1957. However, it is clear that at least some of the University 
Museum’s Mit Rahina team were distraught not to have the further chance to 
influence the practices of Egyptians in the way that had originally been set out. Yet, 
as they voiced this desperation, it was also starting to become clear that that chance 
would not exist.   
 The Egyptian government did not wish the Mit Rahina work to continue, and 
the Department of Antiquities’ communication with the University Museum mirrored 
the state’s increased assertiveness post-Suez. Indeed, a bluntly purposeful letter 
arrived in Philadelphia in October 1957. Written by the new Director of Egypt’s 
Department of Antiquities, Muharram Kamal, the letter, distinctly underwhelmed by 
anything Rainey’s failed institution had done or now had to say for itself, stated that 
the Department could not renew the University Museum’s excavation permit, because 
it now wanted archaeological excavation work to take place in the Egyptian region of 
Nubia: the soon-to-be-initiated construction of the new Aswan High Dam would lead 
to the flooding of the region’s antiquities.52 Post-Suez, the Egyptian government 
began entirely to dictate terms to Western archaeological missions, even as it 
apparently did the Poles a significant favour by allowing them to take home certain 
antiquities. The University Museum’s archaeologists would be welcome in Nubia, but 
their efforts at Mit Rahina had clearly served little purpose.    
Indeed, the planned construction of the new Aswan High Dam had already led 
to a 1955 report, prepared by the Department of Antiquities and distributed 
internationally, outlining which Nubian sites would need to be excavated before 
flooding occurred.
53
 However, while the Department of Antiquities had previously 
requested international assistance, representatives of the institutions that might have 
provided this help had also felt more or less free to ignore the plea. Excavation in 
Egypt had historically taken place north of Nubia, and work outside of the more 
southerly, and potentially much more artefact poor, region represented a far more 
attractive prospect to institutions like the University Museum, even at a site like Mit 
Rahina.
54
 Before Suez, the Egyptian state could not get foreign archaeologists to 
listen to its message.  
Afterwards, however, this situation changed: Egyptian assertiveness following 
Suez dramatically altered events. Indeed, Kamal’s written order for directed 
archaeological excavation in Nubia reflected wider state policy and the consolidation 
of the power of an Egyptian technocracy: the ideal order of the day had become 
modernization work directed by Egyptian state experts. Under Amer’s directorship, 
the Department of Antiquities had gone some way toward this outcome, but under 
Kamal’s lead the institution went further. Could archaeologists from countries like the 
US find a way once again to attempt to assert their own priorities and ideologies? 
Only time would tell. 
 
[B] Conclusion 
 Archaeological work in Egypt reflected the country’s wider decolonizing experience, 
suggesting that postcolonial Egypt was constituted as much through an apparently 
innocuous field like archaeology as through top-level political discussions. The 
University Museum attempted to use the Mit Rahina work not only to foster its own 
influence in Egypt, but also to bring American political ideals into Egypt as the Cold 
War gathered pace. However, the particularities of the Egyptian situation meant that 
those involved with implementing these ideals found them hard to practice, much as 
other US attempts to work with the country seemed to fail. Eventually, too, the 
Egyptian government took a much firmer stance with the University Museum, 
cancelling its work and directing further archaeology toward Nubia. This assertive 
move echoed post-Suez political realities, as Egypt became an increasingly assertive 
state on the world stage.      
 On some level, then, archaeology adds little new insight to the story of 
Egyptian decolonization: the course of archaeological events seems to reflect political 
meta-narratives of the era more generally. However, events at Mit Rahina illustrate 
the particular ways in which this meta-narrative could emerge: in this reading, failure 
in cooperative fieldwork contributed to the path of Egyptian decolonization as much 
as events surrounding the Suez Canal. In a different, more successful, situation, the 
Museum may have kept working at the site, and the development programme it 
attempted to put into practice may have been implemented. The realities of 
decolonization in Egypt thus did not come about in as straightforward a manner as has 
otherwise been suggested, hinting that a more nuanced historical investigation of this 
historical period is necessary.   
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